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MANAGED COMPETITION II:
A PROPOSAL
JACKSON HOLE GROUP*
INTRODUCTION
The managed competition proposals presented by the Jack-
son Hole Group in September 19911 have contributed signifi-
* Copyright © 1994 by the Jackson Hole Group. This Article presents
a plan for reform of public and private health policy in the United States.
These proposals are based on the deliberations of the Jackson Hole Group
(JHG), an ad hoc and changing collection of health executives, leaders,
and experts who have been meeting over the last twenty years to discuss
and address the most serious deficiencies of the health system. The only
consistent participants in the process have been Dr. Paul M. Ellwood,
M.D., President of the Jackson Hole Group, and Alain C. Enthoven,
Ph.D., Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management,
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
These policy proposals include recommendations for major reform and
are the result of JHG participants' operational experience with the system's
problems and their collective sense of what might be accomplished through
aggressive joint public/private efforts spanning the next decade. The reforms
would establish a system of managed competition between accountable
health plans, with government setting the ground rules for competition.
Tax exclusions for health benefits are proposed to shape the capabilities of
organizations delivering medical care, and as a mechanism for curtailing
health services cost inflation.
An expanding group of participants in the JHG critically review these
proposals continually, and gather comments from other interested parties.
The objective is to reach consensus among key providers, insurers, pur-
chasers, and policy makers, establishing common policies to be implemented
within their own organizations. Private sector cooperation and reform is
critical to advancement of the JHG proposals in the public sector. These
ideas now enjoy wide political support as comprehensive, moderate, market-
based health care reforms.
There is no membership in the JHG, only participation by invitation,
as agenda items for the JHG Health Forums are developed. Members of
the press are excluded from the forums as a matter of policy to protect the
participants and to allow free and open discussion.
1. JACKSON HOLE GROUP, THE 21ST CENTURY AMERICAN HEALTH SYSTEM
(1991) [hereinafter MANAGED COMPETITION I] (on file with the Washington
University Journal of Urban & Contemporary Law).
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cantly to the current debate on American health care reform.
Critical elements of our earlier work - purchasing coopera-
tives, accountable health plans, outcomes information - are
instrumental to most current state initiatives2 and many pro-
posals for national legislation.'
While these ideas have formed the basis of mainstream
thinking about health care delivery, Congress and the President
have not yet been able to formulate a consensus strategy for
ensuring universal coverage and effective cost containment. 4
Each proposal for federal legislation seems stymied by its
2. Several states have enacted variations of the managed competition
proposals. These states include Florida, see, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown,
Commissions, Clubs, and Consensus: Reform in Florida, 12:2 HEALTH AFF.
7 (1993) (describing Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993);
Hawaii, see, e.g., Deane Neubauer, Hawaii: A Pioneer in Health Systems
Reform, 12:2 HEALTH AFF. 31 (1993) (describing State Health Insurance
Program of Hawaii); Minnesota, see, e.g., Howard M. Leichter, Minnesota:
The Trip from Acrimony to Accommodation, 12:2 HEALTH AFF. 48 (1993)
(describing the HealthRight and Minnesota Care programs); Oregon, see,
e.g., Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Oregon: The Ups and Downs
of Oregon's Rationing Plan, 12:2 HEALTH AFF. 66 (1993); Vermont, see,
e.g., Howard M. Leichter, Health Care Reform in Vermont: A Work in
Progress, 12:2 HEALTH AFF. 71 (1993) (describing Vermont's Health Care
Act of 1992); and Washington, see, e.g., Robert A. Crittendon, Managed
Competition and Premium Caps in Washington State, 12:2 HEALTH AFr.
82 (1993) (describing the Washington Health Services Act of 1993).
3. See, e.g., the Clinton health plan, H.R. 3600 & S. 1757, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (adopting many proposals contained in MANAGED COMPE-
TITION I); the Chafee/Thomas bill, H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (requiring employers with less than 100 employees to participate
in a purchasing cooperative, and mandating individuals to have health
insurance with a penalty for non-compliance); the Cooper/Breaux bill, H.R.
3222 & S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (promoting a managed
competition-type plan by encouraging the formation of health plan pur-
chasing cooperatives to negotiate health plans for coverage on behalf of
employers with fewer than 100 employees, establishing a basic benefits
package, limiting the deductibility of health plans to the least expensive
cost of the package, and encouraging the formation of accountable health
plans); the Michel/Lott bill, H.R. 3080 & S. 1533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (implementing small group insurance reforms, expanding the Medi-
care program, and providing individuals with tax incentives to save for
medical expenses through "medical IRAs"); the Stark bill, H.R. 200, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing annual budgets based on prior year
national health expenditures, rates for all personal health services, national
standards for health insurance plans, a new federal program to provide
health insurance to all children under age 19, and expanded benefits under
Medicare and Medicaid); the Nickels/Stearns bill, H.R. 3698 & S. 1743,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing medical savings accounts).
4. See Gail R. Wilensky, Health Care Reform: Is 1994 the Year?, supra
this volume, part IV.
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inability to predict the economic consequences of its imple-
mentation .5
Changes of the magnitude envisaged under leading reform
proposals have never been tried before, creating tremendous
uncertainty that threatens to undermine reform. No one can
confidently estimate the costs associated with various propos-
als, how effectively different mandates will achieve universal
coverage, the results of price controls or global budgets and
whether they can be enforced, the lack of capacity that may
result from a continued shortage of primary care practitioners
or delays in accountable health plan (AHP)6 formation, how
employers will use savings, the effects of increased consumer
involvement in the decision-making processes, or the magni-
tude of savings that may be achieved by reducing the amount
of ineffective care.
This level of uncertainty poses a serious risk to implementing
effective reform. That risk, along with other lessons learned
in actually applying managed competition, has caused us to
revise selected parts of the original managed competition pro-
posals. The underlying premise of Managed Competition II is
that reform should adapt to observations and experience. This
is exemplified by a common sense approach in which govern-
ment health care financing is always in balance, and is coupled
with a step-by-step approach to reaching universal coverage.
The original managed care proposals continue to provide the
basic framework for health care reform as summarized in
Table 1.
Managed Competition II presents three technical improve-
ments to the managed competition model, including refine-
ments in the design of Health Plan Stores (HelPS), incentives
for cost consciousness and healthy behavior, and increased
protection for consumer choice of provider. It also adds two
critical policy initiatives to the original model: a balanced
health security budget and a universal coverage program.
5. Id. at part III.D.
6. An Accountable Health Plan (AHP) is a health care delivery organ-
ization that combines the services of health insurance with provision of
medical care to patients. AHPs can take several forms and are sometimes
called integrated care organizations. They will compete with one another
on the basis of quality and cost.
19941
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TABLE 1
Core Elements of Managed Competition that Remain
Unchanged
from Managed Competition I
ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH PLANS (AHPs) - "The Providers"
AHPs are the "engines of reform" and would shift the emphasis in health
care from disease and intervention to prevention and wellness. AHPs are
organizations that:
* Both finance and deliver the standard benefits.
" Are accountable to the public for member satisfaction and the effect
of their services on members' health.
" Comply with solvency and insurance standards, including community
rating and guaranteed issue and renewal provisions.
* Offer doctor choice in at least one AHP per region.
SPONSORS - "The Health Plan Store"
Large employers, government, and Health Plan Stores (HelPS - formerly
known as HPPCs, Health Alliances) would act as sponsors in enabling a
choice of health plans. Additionally, there would be more than one Health
Plan Store permitted in a region. In general the role of the sponsor is to:
" Provide information and incentives for individuals to choose among
competing AHPs.
" Pool risk and achieve economies of scale in purchasing.
" Set rules to assure equitable coverage of all members of the sponsored
group.
" Collect and pay premiums to Accountable Health Plans.
STANDARD BENEFITS - "The Measure of Universal Coverage"
A standard benefit package would:
" Be the services made universally available to all Americans.
" Be continuously amended by the Health Security Commission and
approved by Congress through a process insulated from inordinate
political interference.
" Be based on scientific documentation of efficacy, including cost-
effectiveness.
THE HEALTH SECURITY COMMISSION (HSC) - "The Referee"
The HSC would be an independent federal agency to guide, oversee, and
facilitate a transition to a new health system. HSC powers and responsibility
would be explicitly limited in legislation to:
" Recommending a standard benefits package to Congress.
" Recommend measures to balance the health security budget.
" Coordinating a standardized data reporting system.
" Setting standards for and registering AHPs and HelPS.
" Disseminating information and making recommendations on risk ad-
justment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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I. REFINEMENTS TO THE MANAGED COMPETITION MODEL
A. More and Smaller Health Plan Stores (HelPS)
As introduced in the original managed competition propos-
als, 7 HelPS in a reformed system would act as sponsors for
individuals and small employers, giving them the ability to
pool risk, achieve economies of scale, and drive the competitive
process through informed individual choice. HelPS should not
be regulatory or price-setting agencies, and should not nego-
tiate or limit choice of AHPs. Rather, they should offer an
informed set of choices to help individuals weigh personal
priorities in health plan selection. If HelPS were allowed to
negotiate (i.e., refuse to offer plans whose prices are too high),
individual choice would be limited. In addition, an effectively
functioning and competitive market would be undermined by
concentrating too much purchasing power in a single entity.
While many private sector initiatives are proving effective
in holding down health costs, especially purchasing efforts of
large employers, the problems associated with the small group
and individual markets have not improved and the need for
HelPS remains. We initially proposed creation of a single
exclusive HelPS in each geographic area to address the needs
of the small group market.' Recently, however, we have seen
that concentration of purchasing power in monopoly HelPS
provides a structural device that can be easily applied to
constrain - rather than support - competitive markets.
We now propose a system of competing Health Plan Stores.
States would be required to create a state-sponsored Health
Plan Store for pooling consumer purchasing power, but mul-
tiple stores could be created to compete, provided that each
meets the standards outlined below.
We appreciate the value of HelPS where participation would
be voluntary, and have considered greater reliance on such
structures. Experience has shown, however, that the small
group market is easily fragmented into small, expensive groups
that insurers avoid and small, low cost groups that are easily
insured. Such risk selection, and the associated cost shifts,
remains the central problem which purchasing pools are in-
tended to overcome and which will not be addressed by vol-
untary HelPS.
It therefore seems prudent to start with a system in which
HelPS are the mandatory sponsors for the small group and
7. See MANAGED COMPETITION I, supra note 1, at 15-19 (describing
Health Plan Stores under the rubric of health plan purchasing cooperatives).
8. Id. at 17-18.
19941
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individual markets, in that preferential tax treatment of health
expenditures would be conditional on purchase of coverage
through a licensed HelPS. This competing HelPS structure
would still require special measures to ensure that the market
is not undermined by adverse risk selection. Private sector
organizations or associations could become licensed as HelPS
if they agreed to open enroll, offer all AHPs, cover entire
HelPS regions, meet solvency standards, and conform to other
HelPS standards including a prohibition against conflict of
interest. AHPs would offer the same base community rate to
all HelPS serving designated regions. HelPS would compete
only on their administrative overhead (the cost of which would
be added to premiums) and their customer service. Competing
HelPS that negotiate premiums would undermine community
rating in the small group market. In a system of competing
HelPS, states would have to take on the additional responsi-
bilities of dividing their territory into HelPS regions, and
coordinating risk adjustment and standardized data collection.
With this design, competing HelPS can still achieve the original
HelPS goals, yet satisfy those that contend a need for signif-
icant reform of the small group and individual markets exists.
B. Rewards for Cost-Conscious Consumers
Recent purchaser initiatives and state reforms have recog-
nized the central role of consumer behavior (demand) in shap-
ing successful reform. Any successful reform must include
mechanisms for encouraging cost-sensitive utilization of health
care services and healthy lifestyle. A limit on the tax deduct-
ibility of health benefits remains the best way to instill cost-
consciousness in health plan selection, control government
expenditures, and raise revenue for low-income subsidies with-
out increasing marginal tax rates. A revised tax code that
addresses the concerns of the public while preserving cost-
conscious incentives would include:
" Extending full preferential health insurance tax
treatment to all consumers that purchase coverage
through an appropriate sponsor (i.e., a large em-
ployer or Health Plan Store). A requirement to
use the appropriate group sponsor would ensure
that the risk of costly illness is spread fairly.
* Capping tax deductions and exclusions at the
average of competitive AHP prices in the lowest
quartile (25 percent) of AHP prices in an area
(instead of at the level of the lowest-cost AHP).
" Allowing those who choose an AHP priced below
the tax incentive to keep the difference in a tax-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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free health bonus account to be used to defray
the costs of copayments, deductibles, and benefits
not included in the standard benefits package or
to supplement an individual retirement account.
Allowing health plans to reward health lifestyles
and behaviors with contributions to members'
health bonus accounts.
C. Assuring Choice of Providers (Doctor of Choice-DOC)
The original managed competition proposals did not limit
the type of health care delivery organizations that would
compete in a reformed market. While we continue to support
a marketplace which offers a wide variety of insurance and
delivery models, we acknowledge public concern that consumer
choice should not be restricted. For this reason, every sponsor
should be required to offer at least one AHP with an out-of-
plan (e.g., point-of-service or doctor of choice (DOG)) option,
which allows enrollees to use non-AHP providers at increased
cost. In the event that no AHP within a sponsor's region
offers an out-of-plan option, all AHPs in that region would
be required to do so.
II. UNIVERSAL COVERAGE UNDER MANAGED COMPETITION
A. Balanced Health Security Budget
The original managed competition proposals focused on
structural reforms and did not propose any specific strategy
for financing universal coverage. However, as various financ-
ing schemes have been proposed in legislation, it has become
clear that the financing of health reform has implications for
how structural aspects will interact. A managed competition
approach to structural reform requires a managed competition
approach to financing.
The United States needs to achieve a predictable and ac-
ceptable level of health care spending. In the current environ-
ment, spending cannot be allowed to exceed available funding.
A balanced health security budget would instill fiscal discipline
into the health care system by guaranteeing that federal health
expenditures do not grow faster than revenue and promoting
an honest and explicit debate regarding these expenditures.
The balanced health security budget can be regarded as a
ledger that (1) continuously matches federal revenues to ex-
penses, (2) relates the benefits package to available financial
resources, and (3) relates the benefits package to providers'
demonstrated ability to improve function and well-being. Fed-
1994]
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eral health spending covered by the balanced health security
budget would include low-income subsidies (referred to as
EquiP 1 and 2), 9 Medicare, and the Federal Employee Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP). The increases in lost tax revenue
(tax expenditures) to the federal government, due to the pref-
erential tax treatment of health expenditures, would also be
counted as part of the balanced health security budget, thus
helping to contain the growth in mandated private health
security costs.
Under such a system, government health expenditures would
be disbursed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the health system
would move toward universal coverage in carefully monitored
stages. Each year, Congress and the Health Security Commis-
sion (HSC)Q 0 would adjust three elements of the health care
financing system in order to achieve an annual health budget
target. If projected expenditures exceed the rate of increase in
the health budget target, the HSC would recommend to Con-
gress either (1) an adjustment to the benefits package" or (2)
a slowdown of the expansion in low-income subsidies. If
Congress opted not to accept these recommendations, it would
have to appropriate more money to achieve fiscal balance.
While it might be preferable to have an explicitly earmarked
health tax as the funding source for the balanced health
security budget, it may be best to begin with existing sources
of public health care funding. Ultimately, Congress must know
what it is spending, who is covered for which services, and
the impacts of benefits on the health of Americans.
B. Universal Access as a First Step Toward Universal
Coverage
The best way to achieve universal coverage is through a
competitive, premium-based system with adequate public sub-
sidies for low-income consumers, financed through progressive
taxes. Such a system will require several years to be fully
implemented and effective. Providers will need time to build
high quality health plans, the government will need time to
measure and evaluate progress and accumulate real savings for
public programs from managed competition, and individuals
will need time to understand and avail themselves of the
reformed system. If we wish to build a national system that
is sustainable, affordable, and integrated, then we must intro-
9. See infra part HI.B.
10. See supra Table 1.
11. The benefits package would be voted on in a manner similar to the
military base closing procedure.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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duce significant policy elements carefully, in a way which
permits us to fully understand their effects.
We must first establish a system in which all individuals
have access to affordable coverage - universal access - as a
first step towards universal coverage. Such a system would
help those who need it most (i.e., the poorest individuals
through subsidies, and individuals and small employers through
purchasing cooperatives and insurance reform), allow estab-
lishment of a truly competitive system, and permit a smooth
transition to universal coverage by, say, 2002 if Congress
passes comprehensive health reform in 1994.
Achieving universal coverage in a fiscally realistic manner
will require that public programs are incorporated into a
managed competition system and that a true universal access
system is in place. The remainder of this section discusses a
staging process.
Stage 1 - Equity Program Part 1 (EquiP 1): A government
subsidy program for the current categorically needy acute care
portion of the Medicaid program (those receiving AFDC and
SSI benefits)'2 that "equips" them to obtain coverage.
Perhaps the greatest and most consistent challenge faced by
state governments in recent years has been the dramatic in-
crease in and unpredictability of costs in their Medicaid pro-
grams. While more states, like the private sector, now look to
managed care as a means of tackling cost and quality prob-
lems, little more than ten percent of Medicaid beneficiaries
are in true managed care programs like health maintenance
organizations (HMOs). Reform must accelerate this process to
instill financial discipline and to realize predictability of costs
and accountability for quality where neither have existed for
some time. Furthermore, EquiP beneficiaries should have ac-
cess to the same AHPs and standard benefits as the general
population to eliminate inequities in the health care system.
States would be responsible for the administration of their
respective EquiP 1 programs, which would be fully funded as
of the first year of reform and designed as follows:
* Because together they are generally regarded as
above-average risk and should be explicitly fi-
nanced to ensure their costs are spread equally,
12. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is part of the
Social Security program providing grants to states for aid and services to
needy families with children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) is
another part of the Social Security umbrella. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1994]
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the AFDC and SSI population would be main-
tained, at least initially, as a separate risk pool
that is covered by AHPs.
" Each state, or contracted sponsor acting on behalf
of the state, would base capitation rates for the
EquiP 1 population on actuarially sound estimates
of the average reasonable costs across AHPs of
delivering a standard benefit package adjusted to
the special needs of the AFDC and SSI popula-
tion.
* The federal and state governments would jointly
contribute 100 percent of the price of benefits for
EquiP 1 beneficiaries. States would be required
to maintain their current level of financial com-
mitment to acute Medicaid and uncompensated
care. 3 Thus, they would be at a relatively greater
risk for their AFDC and SSI populations.
" Using a one-year voucher, the EquiP 1 eligible
population could choose from among participat-
ing plans through their own EquiP 1 HelPS dur-
ing the annual open enrollment period. For
individuals who fail to select a health plan, the
EquiP 1 HelPS would choose one for them.
" Once the EquiP 1 population had experience in
AHPs and its risk could be predicted and adjusted
with relative accuracy, it would be served by the
local community HelPS, where the government
would pay a competitive health status-adjusted
community rate on their behalf. Additional ben-
efits that were not part of the initial standard
benefits package available to the general popu-
lation would be added as needed, funded jointly
by states and the federal government and pro-
vided by AHPs.
" While personal costs for Equip 1 beneficiaries
should be mitigated so coverage is within their
reach, they, like everyone else, should pay some
portion of their care to instill a degree of cost-
consciousness.
Stage 2 - Equity Program, Part 2 (EquiP 2): A government
subsidy program for individuals below 200%'o of the poverty
line, and those ineligible for EquiP 1, that "equips" them to
obtain coverage.
13. Current expenditures would be trended forward according to EquiP
1 experience.https://o nscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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The below-poverty uninsured population consists of 10.8
million individuals (28.1 percent of the uninsured), while the
100-200 percent of poverty uninsured population represents an
additional 12.5 million individuals (32.5 percent of the unin-
sured).' 4 In addition to the subsidy available to everyone
through the tax treatment of benefits and the contribution to
health insurance by some employers, this population needs
further subsidies to have meaningful access to the health
system. EquiP 2 eligible individuals would receive subsidies in
the form of vouchers, and would select their coverage through
their local HelPS or large employer, depending upon employ-
ment status, thus minimizing the government's role in the
program. EquiP 2 funding would be phased in as funds accrue
to the government. The initial subsidization targets would be
full subsidization into the low-cost plan for EquiP 2 eligible
individuals below 100 percent of the poverty line, and a sliding
scale of subsidies for beneficiaries between 100 percent and
200 percent of the poverty line.
Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to subsidize
everyone in EquiP 2 by the year 2002. If these subsidies are
effective, at least ninety-five percent of this population should
be covered by then. If ninety-five percent of this population
is not covered, Congress would need to expand the EquiP 2
subsidy program or proceed with some form of coverage
mandate.
The present Medicaid program creates substantial disincen-
tives for returning to work, since beneficiaries lose coverage
after they cross the eligibility threshold. Combined with the
loss of other low-income benefits such as the earned income
tax credit, food stamps, and housing subsidies, this threshold
represents a significant disincentive to earn more. While any
scaling of health care subsidies would be an improvement over
the current system, the pressing need to tackle welfare reform
in conjunction with or soon after health care reform, is ap-
parent. To increase incentives for work, the increase in cost
of health insurance associated with moving to a higher income
bracket should be minimized. This can best be assured by
phasing out public assistance for EquiP 2, at a gradual rate
as income increases, and may require expansion of EquiP 2
beyond 200 percent of the poverty line.
Stage 3 - Guaranteeing Sustainable Universal Health Care
Coverage
14. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SPECIAL REPORT AND ISSUE
BRIEF 145: SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNINSURED 33, tbl. 14 (1994) (on file with the Washington University
Journal of Urban & Contemporary Law).
1994]
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No system which provides for responsible financing can
guarantee identical coverage for every U.S. resident. Just as
definitions of "full employment" accommodate known struc-
tural deficiencies of the employment market, any working
definition of "universal coverage" should allow for known
political constraints (e.g., resistance to mandates) as well as
unknown behavioral responses to reform (e.g., possible reluc-
tance of the wealthy to purchase insurance). Universal coverage
might be defined as the point at which it can be verified that,
say, ninety-five percent of the population is covered. 5 As
reform proceeds, the target percentage could be adjusted to
reflect the point at which the additional cost of bringing
individuals into the health security system through government
means, such as a mandate or increased outreach, is too great
for the public to accept. At some point it may make sense to
adopt a policy that uniquely targets care for the residual
percentage of uninsured, rather than devoting limited resources
to the difficult and expensive task of pulling every individual
into the general system of universal coverage.
To ensure that universal coverage is achieved within a rea-
sonable timeframe, legislation should include a mandate (com-
pulsory coverage) for the year 2002. If universal coverage, as
defined by Congress, has not been achieved by 2002, this
measure would automatically force Congress to implement a
mandate unless it took proactive measures to attain universal
coverage by other means, such as increasing the scope of the
Equity Program.,
Congress should defer a decision on the nature of the
mandate until 2002 to ensure that it is the appropriate measure.
By then, much will have been gained from experience with a
reformed system. Broad low-income subsidies would be at or
near full phase-in; competing AHPs would be functioning;
group purchasing and health insurance reforms would have
been in place for some time; and the residual uninsured
population would likely be less significant in number and
different in character than the presently uninsured population.
Only with accurate information regarding the number and
percentage of uninsured by employment status, income and
demographic groups, geographic location, and health status
can an informed decision be made regarding what type of
compulsion, if necessary, would best lead to universal cover-
age. For example, if it is primarily low-income, unemployed
individuals that remain uninsured, it is unlikely that any form
15. We are currently conducting some analysis that may allow us to be
more precise in defining universal coverage.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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of mandate would be effective; instead, changes to the EquiP
program would be required. On the other hand, if mostly
wealthy, non-working individuals were uninsured, a free-rider
tax would probably be the most effective way to achieve
universal coverage. Finally, if large numbers of employed
individuals were uninsured, an employer mandate might be
the most appropriate alternative. 16
Medicare
Medicare recipients should have the opportunity to receive
the same universal standard benefits as the general population,
with the same choice of providers and health plans. Equally,
beneficiaries should be motivated to save money and pursue
prevention and health maintenance measures. While reform of
Medicare cannot be immediate because many beneficiaries
value the present program, Medicare should ultimately resem-
ble the rest of the health care system. The standard benefits
package will be more comprehensive than current Medicare
benefits and will potentially eliminate the need for medigap17
policies. While AHPs should be paid on a capitated basis for
providing this enhanced benefits package to Medicare benefi-
ciaries, cost-cutting measures proposed by Congress and im-
plemented by HCFA' 8 could continue to control traditional
Medicare expenditures. Medicare would start to be integrated
into a managed competition environment as follows:
* The Medicare population would be maintained as
a separate higher risk and cost group. During an
annual open enrollment period, regional Medicare
HelPS would allow current Medicare beneficiaries
to choose between traditional HCFA-administered
Medicare with the present Medicare benefits, and
competing AHPs offering the more comprehen-
sive standard package, including prescription
drugs. Beneficiaries would have a greater choice
of AHPs than present law permits, including
AHPs that offer an out-of-plan provider option.
* For beneficiaries who choose an AHP, the federal
government would make a defined contribution
toward premiums. Under present law, Medicare
risk-contracting HMOs are paid ninety-five per-
16. See infra Appendix for further discussion of mandates.
17. Medigap policies are insurance policies which may be purchased by
individuals to supplement Medicare benefits. VERGIL N. SLEE & DEBORA A.
SLEE, HEALTH CARE REFORm TERMS 53 (1993).
18. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) administers the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
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cent of what HCFA estimates it would have paid
for Medicare-covered services had beneficiaries
remained in the fee-for-service sector. This system
is fraught with problems, including ties to fee-
for-service medicine and the geographic inequities
in the distribution of Medicare reimbursement
that penalizes regions of the country where health
care expenditures are lower and better managed.
Whatever future payment methodology is used, it
should allow for a transition toward a system in
which Medicare reimbursement is determined by
competitive bidding and consumer cost sensitivity
(as in the private sector), and low cost regions
are rewarded for their effectiveness. One such
system would tie the government contribution to
the average of competitive AHP bids in the lowest
quartile of AHP prices in a Medicare HelPS
region, or the adjusted average per capita cost
(AAPCC), whichever is lowest. Once the penetra-
tion of AHPs into the Medicare market exceeded
a certain percentage, say, fifty percent, the tie to
the AAPCC would be removed.
" Beneficiaries who choose an AHP would be re-
sponsible for paying the difference between the
government contribution and the premium cost
of their plan of choice. Present employer-spon-
sored retiree health benefits that pay for wrap-
around coverage could be redirected to defray the
difference between the government's defined con-
tribution and an AHP's premium. Also, employ-
ers and retirees might agree to reconfigure retiree
health benefits into a defined contribution, added
to the government contribution, so that those who
join AHPs receive the savings derived from their
purchasing decisions.
• Beneficiaries that age into the Medicare program
would be encouraged to continue obtaining stan-
dard coverage from AHPs.
" Eligible low-income Medicare beneficiaries would
continue to receive premium and cost-sharing as-
sistance through EquiP 1 or 2.
" The present policies that impede HMOs from
participation in the Medicare risk contracting pro-
gram would be aggressively reduced with a sig-
nificant shift toward policies that develop
Medicare-oriented AHPs and encourage them to
compete to serve beneficiaries.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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As AHPs find ways to improve efficiency, they should be
able to offer rates that are at or below the contribution set
by government, even though they offer a richer standard
benefits package. The opportunity to obtain more benefits at
no additional, or only slightly higher cost, as well as continuity
of care though primary care physicians, reduced paperwork,
and the elimination of the need to purchase a Medigap policy,
should motivate Medicare beneficiaries to join AHPs. How-
ever, present Medicare beneficiaries who place more value on
the fee-for-service alternative could retain the opportunity to
stay in the current system.
As AHPs succeed in lowering their costs below fee-for-
service Medicare program costs, and more Medicare benefici-
aries choose to enroll in AHPs, the federal government would
achieve significant savings.
CONCLUSION
We can only achieve the required broad-based support for
health care reform if we avoid rash, complex, and untested
strategies. Federal reform measures must be sufficiently flex-
ible to adapt to whatever new behaviors emerge in response
to the changed health care environment. They must not pre-
empt our ability to adjust key elements of the financing system
as we learn more about what works. It would be foolhardy
to guarantee universal delivery of a rich package of benefits
only to find ourselves bankrupt before the decade expires,
thereby undermining every American's ability to receive needed
health care.
Managed Competition II is offered as a pragmatic approach
to achieving universal coverage. If its concepts are ultimately
selected as a template for reform, then several key elements
of Managed Competition II are necessary if the integrity and
effectiveness of the proposal are to be preserved:
1. Staging of health care reform with the attainment of
universal coverage by a specific date that allows a sufficient
time interval for the development of a lasting health care
system.
2. Establishment of a health system based on consumers
choosing between accountable health plans which compete on
both price and quality.
3. Promotion of cost, quality, and health-conscious decisions
by consumers.
4. Obligatory purchasing of health plans through group
sponsors including Health Plan Stores and large employers.
5. A public program of equitable health care with the same
incentives and benefit choices as the private sector.
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6. A balanced health security budget with pay-as-you-go
financing of public health expenditures that prevents unfunded
health care entitlements and instills fiscal responsibility.
It is our desire that Managed Competition II will expose to
public and political scrutiny the interplay between funding,
benefit levels, and health care effectiveness. It is designed to
expedite access to affordable insurance coverage to every
American, and provide a mechanism for sustaining universal
coverage far into the future, regardless of shifts in the political
mood, advances in technology, or changes in public needs.
National health care reform cannot hope to fix on a perfect
financing formula in 1994; it must put in place, instead,
prudent mechanisms for experimenting with, learning from,
and responsibly managing our health care economy in the long
term.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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APPENDIX: DISCUSSION OF MANDATES
I. COMBINATION OF MANDATES
A combination of employer and individual mandates, as
outlined in Table A-1, best builds on the current employment-
based system, ensuring that the 99 percent of companies above
the 100-person threshold currently offering coverage to their
employees would continue to do so.
TABLE A-I
Description of Combination of Mandates
EMPLOYER MANDATE FOR LARGE EMPLOYERS
" All employers with more than 100 employees would have to offer a
choice of AHPs offering the standard health benefits package to
employees who work more than 30 hours per week and their depend-
ents. Employers would be required to make a defined contribution of
a minimum of, say, 50% of the price of the low cost plan to health
care premiums of their employees. To minimize employment effects,
the prorated contribution requirement would be phased in over a
period of time. A prorated contribution would be required for part-
time workers who worked more than 1,000 hours per year and a
payroll tax of X0 would be paid for workers who work 1,000 or
less.
" To assuage effects on employers near the HelPS threshold size, there
would be a gradation of their financial obligation in accordance with
firm size. These employers would not be relieved of their obligation
to offer standard health care benefits.
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL
EMPLOYERS
" Part-time workers (not otherwise covered) working 1,000 hours or less
per annum for an employer with more than 100 employees, and all
individuals (not otherwise covered) not employed or those employed
by firms with less than 100 employees, would be obliged to purchase
coverage through their local HelPS.
" At the direction of their employees, small employers would be required
to make a monthly payroll deduction and send the amount to the
appropriate HelPS.
To the extent that large businesses compete with small
businesses in the same industry, employee compensation pack-
ages would differ, but since a mandate would exist in both
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sectors, total compensation in any individual firm should not
be different. However, if employees do not recognize the trade-
off between wages and benefits, small employers would have
a hiring advantage. A combination of employer and individual
mandates would increase the incentives for firms to game the
threshold by engaging in such actions as hiring temporary
personnel and splitting companies into separate entities. How-
ever, this may be mitigated by phasing in the percentage
requirement with firm size.
Income is the major determinant in access to health insur-
ance, not size of firm in which one is employed. Therefore,
for a combination approach to be equitable and efficient, the
subsidization formula used must be consistent across mandate
environments, and tied to income level (as in the EquiP
program),1 9 not employment status. Individuals eligible for
Equip subsidization would use their vouchers either through
their large employer or their HelPS20 to defray the cost of
coverage. If, on the other hand, subsidies under the employer
mandate were targeted at employers, as opposed to individuals,
the employer mandate portion of the combined mandate would
represent an inequitable and inefficient financing mechanism,
and would result in the reallocation of labor on the basis of
the subsidies available (so-called sorting).
The most expedient, efficient, and politically viable way to
enforce the individual portion of the mandate would be through
a free-rider tax. Individuals choosing not to purchase coverage
would be required to pay a tax. Advantages of a free-rider
tax are that it could be progressive and enforced by the IRS.
The free-rider tax would be equal to a fixed amount plus a
penalty that would be directly proportional to income. While
such an enforcement strategy would not perfectly attain uni-
versal coverage, it would go a long way toward ending the
free-rider problem while minimizing societal and economic
dislocation.
Some proposals have embraced employer mandates and sub-
sidies targeted at firms because they allow the government to
shift some of the burden of public programs onto employers
and create the perception that no one is paying the price.
While fiscally attractive to the government, this type of man-
date perpetuates cost-shifting, and causes the most economic
dislocation because it effectively raises the minimum wage in
many firms. To the extent that employers were unable to take
the additional costs of health premiums out of wages, an
19. See supra part II.B.
20. See supra part I.A.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
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employer mandate would cause some unemployment, especially
in firms not currently offering coverage and in firms with low-
wage workers.
II. INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
If individuals are targeted to receive low-income subsidies
to make those subsidies more explicit, efficient, and equitable,
a mandate targeted at individuals makes sense as well (see
Table A-2). An individual mandate could be implemented
easily and quickly without disrupting present purchasing ar-
rangements. It would satisfy those who believe the ultimate
obligation to purchase health care should be on the individual,
not the employer, and that health care coverage should be
divorced from employment status.
TABLE A-2
Description of Individual Mandate
" All individuals would be required to purchase coverage as of the date
of implementation or pay a free-rider tax.
* All employers, while not required to finance coverage, would be
required to offer coverage, either through the HelPS if they have
fewer than 100 employees, or directly for large employers.
" Voucher eligibility and preferential tax treatment would be contingent
upon purchasing coverage through the appropriate sponsor.
The greatest potential disadvantage of an individual mandate
is the risk that companies that are currently active, value-
based health purchasers will cease these activities, and will
perform the minimum duties necessary to fulfill the obligation
to offer coverage. It is not possible to predict the'extent of
this behavior. However, business leaders suggest that compet-
itive forces in the labor market may be sufficiently strong to
maintain an active employer role, especially if there is a
stipulation that predicates tax-preferred treatment of health
expenditures on purchasing through the appropriate sponsor
(the large employer for its employees). In addition, in a
mandated environment, employees will value health purchasing
that maximizes the wage portion of their compensation and
secures quality health care. Employees of large firms without
access to HelPS will look to their employers for purchasing
expertise, since most employers purchase coverage for em-
ployees today. If large employers prove to be inefficient pur-
chasers, it would be possible for employees to pressure their
employers to go to secondary purchasers, such as purchasing
coalitions, to purchase coverage.
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Another potential serious disadvantage of an individual man-
date is that upon passage, all individuals might demand access
to HelPS. It is unlikely that Congress would have the political
will to deny this. If the public then demanded that HelPS
exercise greater control over the cost of health care, the result
could be a slow, but steady progression toward covering a
great majority of the population through HelPS - leading to
regulation and possibly a single-payer system. To some extent,
competing HelPS should mitigate this danger.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/5
